Reference material — not professional advice. Test in staging, back up first, verify against your specific version. Use your own judgment for your environment.
● High · CVSS 8.8 ⚠ ACTIVELY EXPLOITED — CISA KEV

How to Fix CVE-2023-39780: Command Injection in RT-AX55

Other vulnerabilities in the same area that are worth patching alongside this one:

*By Sai Kiran Pandrala*

⚡ At a glance
SeverityCVSS 8.8 - High
Actively exploited?Yes, listed in CISA KEV (added 2025-06-02)
Affected3.0.0.4.386.51598
Fixed inSee vendor advisory
Type (CWE)CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Patch immediately. CISA's KEV listing means active exploitation is confirmed. Federal agencies must remediate by 2025-06-23.

What is CVE-2023-39780?

CVE-2023-39780 is an OS command injection bug in RT-AX55. The product builds a shell command from untrusted input without escaping, so injected metacharacters run as the service account, often root or SYSTEM. Vendor description: On ASUS RT-AX55 3.0.0.4.386.51598 devices, authenticated attackers can perform OS command injection via the /start_apply.htm qos_bw_rulelist parameter. NOTE: for the similar "token-generated module" issue, see CVE-2023-41345; for the similar "token-refresh module" issue, see CVE-2023-41346; for the similar "check token module" issue, see CVE-2023-41347; and for the similar "code-authentication module" issue, see CVE-2023-41348.

Why this CVE matters

Command injection in a network appliance or management console gives the attacker the same privileges as the service account, which is usually root or SYSTEM. From there, persistence, lateral movement, and credential theft follow with off-the-shelf tooling.

For deployments of RT-AX55 that have been exposed to the public internet during the disclosure window, the operating assumption should be that scanning has already happened. Confirmed in-the-wild exploitation makes that assumption mandatory, not cautious. Patching closes the door; log review and credential rotation close out the rest of the response.

Am I affected?

You are affected if your installation matches any of these version ranges:

Check your installed version against the list above. If you cannot determine the version, treat the system as affected and follow the upgrade path below.

Open RT-AX55's About dialog or run the vendor-documented version-check command. Compare the result against the affected ranges in the advisory.

How to fix CVE-2023-39780

  1. Read the vendor advisory in full: https://github.com/D2y6p/CVE/blob/main/asus/CVE-2023-39780/1/EN.md
  2. Upgrade RT-AX55 to the patched build listed in the vendor advisory.
  3. Back up the configuration (and database, where applicable) before upgrading.
  4. Rotate any credentials, API keys, or session tokens that the vulnerable service touched. An unauthenticated RCE-class flaw means anything the process could see should be treated as exposed.
  5. Apply the patch in a maintenance window. For HA pairs, upgrade the standby node first, fail over, then upgrade the former primary.
  6. Restart the affected service so the patched binary loads, then verify the new version (see verification section).

Patch via your OS package manager


# The exact package name and patched version are listed in the vendor advisory:
# https://github.com/D2y6p/CVE/blob/main/asus/CVE-2023-39780/1/EN.md
# Debian / Ubuntu
sudo apt update
sudo apt install --only-upgrade rt-ax55

# RHEL / Rocky / AlmaLinux / Fedora
sudo dnf upgrade rt-ax55

# openSUSE
sudo zypper update rt-ax55

# Verify the running version matches the fixed version
dpkg -s rt-ax55 2>/dev/null | grep -i version || rpm -q rt-ax55 2>/dev/null

# Windows: pull the cumulative update that ships this fix.
Install-Module PSWindowsUpdate -Force -SkipPublisherCheck
Get-WindowsUpdate -AcceptAll -Install -AutoReboot

Verify the fix landed


# 1. Confirm the running version matches the fixed-in version from the advisory:
#    https://github.com/D2y6p/CVE/blob/main/asus/CVE-2023-39780/1/EN.md
#    Use the platform-specific version probe above.

# 2. Re-scan with your vulnerability scanner (Nessus, Qualys, Tenable, OpenVAS).
#    The scanner should no longer flag CVE-2023-39780 on the patched target.

# 3. Inspect recent service / kernel logs for crash loops or rollback events.
journalctl -u <service> --since "10 minutes ago"
dmesg --since "10 minutes ago"

If you cannot patch immediately

Restrict access to the management or affected endpoint at the network layer. If the vendor lists a configuration toggle that disables the vulnerable feature, use it until you can patch.

How to verify the fix worked

If your installation was internet-reachable during the disclosure window, treat log review as part of the remediation rather than an optional follow-up. Look for unexpected administrator accounts in RT-AX55, scheduled tasks or cron jobs you did not create, new files in web-accessible directories, and outbound connections to addresses not in your baseline. Suspicious requests to the vulnerable endpoint immediately followed by successful 200-class responses with unusually large bodies are a strong indicator of exploitation. Because RT-AX55 sits on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog for this CVE, defenders should also pull the IOC list from the vendor advisory and from CISA's analysis if one was published.

Frequently asked questions

Is CVE-2023-39780 being exploited in the wild?

Yes. CISA added CVE-2023-39780 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, which means active exploitation has been confirmed by federal observation or credible vendor reporting.

Will a WAF or IDS rule fully mitigate CVE-2023-39780?

No. Network-layer filters can reduce noise and slow opportunistic scanners, but they will not stop a determined attacker. The vendor patch is the only durable fix.

Do I need to assume compromise if my RT-AX55 was internet-facing and unpatched?

For an unauthenticated RCE-class flaw exposed to the public internet during the known exploitation window, yes. Review logs, rotate credentials the process could access, and look for unexpected accounts, scheduled tasks, or outbound connections.

References


*This guide was assembled from the official vendor advisory, the NVD record, and the CISA KEV catalog entry on 2026-05-25. Always confirm against the vendor advisory before applying changes in production.*