How to Fix CVE-2026-0250: Command Injection in GlobalProtect App
Related fixes
Other vulnerabilities in the same area that are worth patching alongside this one:
- How to Fix CVE-2026-0228: Code Injection RCE in Cloud NGFW — Code Injection RCE in Cloud NGFW
- How to Fix CVE-2026-0264: Path Traversal in Cloud NGFW — Path Traversal in Cloud NGFW
- How to Fix CVE-2026-0258: SSRF Vulnerability in Cloud NGFW , SSRF Vulnerability in Cloud NGFW
- How to Fix CVE-2026-0238: Input Validation Flaw in Broker VM , Input Validation Flaw in Broker VM
- How to Fix CVE-2026-0259: Arbitrary File Read in WildFire WF-500 and WF-500-B , Arbitrary File Read in WildFire WF-500 and WF-500-B
*By Sai Kiran Pandrala*
| Severity | CVSS 5.2 - Medium |
|---|---|
| Actively exploited? | Not currently listed in CISA KEV |
| Affected | 6.3.0 < 6.3.3-h9 (6.3.3-999), 6.2.0 < 6.2.8-h10 (6.2.8-948), 6.1 < 6.1.13, 6.3.0 < 6.3.3-h2 (6.3.3-42), 6.0.0 < 6.0.11, 6.0 < 6.0.13, and others |
| Fixed in | All |
| Type (CWE) | CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write |
What is CVE-2026-0250?
CVE-2026-0250 is an OS command injection bug in GlobalProtect App. The product builds a shell command from untrusted input without escaping, so injected metacharacters run as the service account, often root or SYSTEM. Vendor description: A buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect™ app that enables a man in the middle attacker to disrupt system processes and potentially execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. This vulnerability is triggered during the processing of requests and responses exchanged between Portal and Gateway.
Why this CVE matters
Command injection in a network appliance or management console gives the attacker the same privileges as the service account, which is usually root or SYSTEM. From there, persistence, lateral movement, and credential theft follow with off-the-shelf tooling.
For deployments of GlobalProtect App that have been exposed to the public internet during the disclosure window, the operating assumption should be that scanning has already happened. Even where exploitation has not been publicly observed, scanning for the vulnerable fingerprint is cheap and routine. Patching closes the door; log review and credential rotation close out the rest of the response.
Am I affected?
You are affected if your installation matches any of these version ranges:
- GlobalProtect App: 6.3.0 < 6.3.3-h9 (6.3.3-999)
- GlobalProtect App: 6.2.0 < 6.2.8-h10 (6.2.8-948)
- GlobalProtect App: 6.1 < 6.1.13
- GlobalProtect App: 6.3.0 < 6.3.3-h2 (6.3.3-42)
- GlobalProtect App: 6.0.0 < 6.0.11
- GlobalProtect App: 6.0 < 6.0.13
- GlobalProtect App: 6.0 < 6.0.14
- GlobalProtect App: 6.3 < 6.3.3-h10
Check your installed version against the list above. If you cannot determine the version, treat the system as affected and follow the upgrade path below.
On PAN-OS, run show system info | match sw-version from the CLI, or read the Dashboard widget in the GUI.
How to fix CVE-2026-0250
- Read the vendor advisory in full: https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2026-0250
- Upgrade GlobalProtect App to All or a later version listed in the vendor advisory.
- Back up the configuration (and database, where applicable) before upgrading.
- Rotate any credentials, API keys, or session tokens that the vulnerable service touched. An unauthenticated RCE-class flaw means anything the process could see should be treated as exposed.
- Apply the patch in a maintenance window. For HA pairs, upgrade the standby node first, fail over, then upgrade the former primary.
- Restart the affected service so the patched binary loads, then verify the new version (see verification section).
Apply the iOS / iPadOS update
# Check the current iOS build on a tethered device (libimobiledevice)
ideviceinfo -k ProductVersion
ideviceinfo -k BuildVersion
# Update to iOS / iPadOS 6.3.3-h9 (6.3.3-999) or later.
# On-device: Settings -> General -> Software Update -> Download and Install
# Confirm fleet iOS devices have updated (Intune example)
Connect-MgGraph -Scopes Device.Read.All
Get-MgDeviceManagementManagedDevice -Filter "operatingSystem eq 'iOS'" |
Where-Object { $_.OSVersion -lt "6.3.3-h9 (6.3.3-999)" } |
Select-Object DeviceName, OSVersion, UserPrincipalName
Verify the fix landed
# 1. Confirm the running version matches the fixed-in version from the advisory:
# https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2026-0250
# Use the platform-specific version probe above.
# 2. Re-scan with your vulnerability scanner (Nessus, Qualys, Tenable, OpenVAS).
# The scanner should no longer flag CVE-2026-0250 on the patched target.
# 3. Inspect recent service / kernel logs for crash loops or rollback events.
journalctl -u <service> --since "10 minutes ago"
dmesg --since "10 minutes ago"
If you cannot patch immediately
Restrict access to the management or affected endpoint at the network layer. If the vendor lists a configuration toggle that disables the vulnerable feature, use it until you can patch.
How to verify the fix worked
- After applying the patch, verify the running version in the product's admin UI or via the vendor-documented CLI command.
- Confirm the patched build matches the version listed in the vendor advisory.
- Run an authenticated vulnerability scan with a current signature set and confirm the scanner no longer flags CVE-2026-0250.
- Review logs for the entire pre-patch window for indicators of compromise listed in the vendor or CISA advisory.
- Confirm any network-layer mitigations that were applied as a stopgap have been reverted (or left in place intentionally) once the patch is verified.
If your installation was internet-reachable during the disclosure window, treat log review as part of the remediation rather than an optional follow-up. Look for unexpected administrator accounts in GlobalProtect App, scheduled tasks or cron jobs you did not create, new files in web-accessible directories, and outbound connections to addresses not in your baseline. Suspicious requests to the vulnerable endpoint immediately followed by successful 200-class responses with unusually large bodies are a strong indicator of exploitation.
Frequently asked questions
Is CVE-2026-0250 being exploited in the wild?
Public exploitation has not been confirmed by CISA at the time of writing. Treat the patch as time-sensitive anyway; reports often lag actual abuse.
Will a WAF or IDS rule fully mitigate CVE-2026-0250?
No. Network-layer filters can reduce noise and slow opportunistic scanners, but they will not stop a determined attacker. The vendor patch is the only durable fix.
Do I need to assume compromise if my GlobalProtect App was internet-facing and unpatched?
For an unauthenticated RCE-class flaw exposed to the public internet during the known exploitation window, yes. Review logs, rotate credentials the process could access, and look for unexpected accounts, scheduled tasks, or outbound connections.
References
- Official vendor advisory: https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2026-0250
- NVD entry: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0250
- CISA KEV catalog: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
*This guide was assembled from the official vendor advisory, the NVD record, and the CISA KEV catalog entry on 2026-05-25. Always confirm against the vendor advisory before applying changes in production.*