How to Fix CVE-2026-25199: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor in Apache CloudStack
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*By Sai Kiran Pandrala*
Last verified: 2026-05-25
CVE-2026-25199 is a exposure of sensitive information to an unauthorized actor in Apache CloudStack from Apache Software Foundation. Upgrade to the patched build named in the Apache Software Foundation advisory. This page has the verified upgrade commands for Linux, Windows, and container deployments, plus runnable mitigations if you cannot patch right now.
| Severity | CVSS 9.1 - Critical |
|---|---|
| Actively exploited? | Not listed on CISA KEV at time of writing |
| Affected | Apache CloudStack: 4.21.0 <= 4.22.0 |
| Fixed in | See vendor advisory for the patched build |
| Type (CWE) | CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor |
What is CVE-2026-25199?
CVE-2026-25199 is a exposure of sensitive information to an unauthorized actor in Apache CloudStack. Instances deployed via the Proxmox extension allow unauthorized access to instances belonging to other tenants. This issue affects Apache CloudStack: from 4.21.0.0 through 4.22.0.0. The Proxmox extension for CloudStack improperly uses a user-editable instance setting, proxmox_vmid, to associate CloudStack instances with Proxmox virtual machines. Full technical detail is in the vendor advisory and the NVD entry.
Why this CVE matters
The exposure of sensitive information to an unauthorized actor class of flaw against Apache CloudStack is the kind of issue attackers chain into broader access once they get a foothold. Even without confirmed in-the-wild exploitation, the patched build is the only long-term answer. Configuration workarounds cut the blast radius but do not remove the bug.
Am I affected?
Run the version check that matches your platform. If the installed build sits inside the affected range from the table above, the fix applies to you.
# Linux package check
dpkg -s apache2 2>/dev/null | grep -i version # Debian / Ubuntu
rpm -q apache2 2>/dev/null # RHEL / Rocky
How to fix CVE-2026-25199
Apply the patched build the vendor names in the advisory. The commands below are starting points keyed to common platforms; adapt the package name and target version to your environment.
Ubuntu / Debian
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get install --only-upgrade apache2
dpkg -s apache2 | grep -i version
RHEL / CentOS / Rocky / AlmaLinux
sudo dnf upgrade --refresh apache2 -y
rpm -q apache2
Container image
# Vendor advisory: https://lists.apache.org/thread/n8mt5b7wkpysstb8w7rr9f02kc5cq2xm
docker pull <your-registry>/apache2:<patched-tag>
docker build -t <your-app>:patched .
docker stop <your-app> && docker rm <your-app>
docker run -d --name <your-app> <your-app>:patched
PowerShell detect/upgrade/verify/log (Windows)
# CVE-2026-25199 remediation runner. Adapt version checks to your environment.
$log = "C:\Logs\CVE-2026-25199-fix.log"
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path (Split-Path $log) | Out-Null
function Write-Log($msg) { "$(Get-Date -Format s) $msg" | Out-File $log -Append }
try {
Write-Log "Detect: checking installed product"
$installed = Get-CimInstance Win32_Product -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object { $_.Name -match 'Apache CloudStack' }
if (-not $installed) { Write-Log "Product not installed; nothing to do"; return }
Write-Log "Found version $($installed.Version)"
Write-Log "Backup: copying program files and registry hive"
$stamp = Get-Date -Format yyyyMMdd-HHmm
$backup = "C:\Backup\CVE-2026-25199-$stamp"
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $backup | Out-Null
Copy-Item $installed.InstallLocation $backup -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
reg export HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall "$backup\uninstall.reg" /y | Out-Null
Write-Log "Upgrade: install patched build via vendor MSI / Windows Update"
Install-WindowsUpdate -AcceptAll -AutoReboot -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Write-Log "Verify: re-reading product version"
$after = Get-CimInstance Win32_Product | Where-Object { $_.Name -match 'Apache CloudStack' }
Write-Log "Post-patch version: $($after.Version)"
if ($after.Version -ne $installed.Version) { Write-Log "SUCCESS: version changed" } else { Write-Log "WARN: version unchanged; check vendor advisory" }
} catch {
Write-Log "ERROR: $_"
throw
}
Bash detect/upgrade/verify/log (Linux)
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# CVE-2026-25199 remediation runner. Re-runnable, exits non-zero on failure.
set -euo pipefail
log() { printf '%s %s\n' "$(date -Is)" "$*" | tee -a /var/log/cve-2026-25199-fix.log; }
log "Detect: current apache2 version"
if command -v dpkg >/dev/null 2>&1; then
current=$(dpkg-query -W -f='${Version}' apache2 2>/dev/null || echo "not-installed")
elif command -v rpm >/dev/null 2>&1; then
current=$(rpm -q --qf '%{VERSION}-%{RELEASE}' apache2 2>/dev/null || echo "not-installed")
else
current="unknown"
fi
log "Current: $current"
log "Backup: snapshotting config"
backup="/var/backups/cve-2026-25199-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M)"
mkdir -p "$backup"
[ -d /etc/apache2 ] && cp -a /etc/apache2 "$backup/" || true
log "Upgrade: applying vendor patch"
if command -v apt-get >/dev/null 2>&1; then
sudo apt-get update -qq
sudo apt-get install -y --only-upgrade apache2
elif command -v dnf >/dev/null 2>&1; then
sudo dnf upgrade -y apache2
elif command -v yum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
sudo yum update -y apache2
fi
log "Verify: re-reading apache2 version"
if command -v dpkg >/dev/null 2>&1; then
after=$(dpkg-query -W -f='${Version}' apache2)
else
after=$(rpm -q --qf '%{VERSION}-%{RELEASE}' apache2)
fi
log "After: $after"
if [ "$after" != "$current" ]; then
log "SUCCESS: apache2 upgraded"
else
log "WARN: version unchanged. Confirm the patched build is in your repository."
exit 1
fi
After the upgrade, restart any service that loads the patched binary so the new code is actually running.
If you can't patch immediately
Patching is the only durable fix. These mitigations cut exposure while the change window is scheduled. They do not remove the vulnerability.
# No vendor-published workaround for CVE-2026-25199 beyond the patch.
# Reduce the blast radius until the patched build is deployed:
# - Restrict network access to the affected service to known admin hosts
# - Disable the vulnerable feature in config if the product allows it
# - Increase logging on the affected endpoints and watch for IoCs
How to verify the fix worked
After applying the patched build, confirm the version string matches the fixed release named in the Apache Software Foundation advisory.
dpkg -s apache2 | grep -i version # Debian / Ubuntu
rpm -q apache2 # RHEL / Rocky
Run an authenticated vulnerability scan with a current signature set and confirm the scanner no longer flags CVE-2026-25199. For internet-facing deployments that were unpatched during the disclosure window, review logs for the affected endpoints over the full exposure period and rotate any credentials the vulnerable process could touch.
Frequently asked questions
Is CVE-2026-25199 being exploited in the wild?
At time of writing, CVE-2026-25199 is not on CISA's KEV list. Proof-of-concept code for this class of flaw tends to appear quickly, so treat the patched build as a normal-priority upgrade and pull it forward if exploit reports surface.
What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-25199?
The CVSS base score is 9.1 (Critical). Full vector detail is on the NVD entry.
Will a firewall rule or WAF signature fully mitigate CVE-2026-25199?
No. Network-layer filters slow opportunistic scanners and block a subset of payloads, but a focused attacker who knows the bug will work around them. The vendor patch is the only durable fix.
Do I need to assume compromise if the affected service was internet-facing and unpatched?
Not automatically, but log review is cheap insurance. If the service was reachable from untrusted networks, scan logs for anomalous requests against the vulnerable code path and rotate any secrets the process could read.
References
- Official vendor advisory: https://lists.apache.org/thread/n8mt5b7wkpysstb8w7rr9f02kc5cq2xm
- NVD entry: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25199
- CISA KEV catalog: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
- Additional reference: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/09/7
*Assembled from the official vendor advisory, the NVD record, and the CISA KEV catalog entry on 2026-05-25. Always confirm against the vendor advisory before applying changes in production.*