How to Fix CVE-2026-33980: Code Injection RCE in adx-mcp-server
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*By Sai Kiran Pandrala*
| Severity | CVSS 8.3 - High |
|---|---|
| Actively exploited? | Not currently listed in CISA KEV |
| Affected | <= 1.1.0 |
| Fixed in | See vendor advisory |
| Type (CWE) | CWE-943: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic |
What is CVE-2026-33980?
CVE-2026-33980 is a code injection flaw in adx-mcp-server. Attacker-controlled input is evaluated as code by the application runtime, giving the attacker arbitrary execution inside the process. Vendor description: Azure Data Explorer MCP Server is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that enables AI assistants to execute KQL queries and explore Azure Data Explorer (ADX/Kusto) databases through standardized interfaces. Versions up to and including 0.1.1 contain KQL (Kusto Query Language) injection vulnerabilities in three MCP tool handlers: get_table_schema, sample_table_data, and get_table_details.
Why this CVE matters
Code injection against an application server is a direct path to remote code execution. The attacker executes inside the application runtime, which means database credentials, integration keys, and any secrets the process has loaded in memory are all exposed.
For deployments of adx-mcp-server that have been exposed to the public internet during the disclosure window, the operating assumption should be that scanning has already happened. Even where exploitation has not been publicly observed, scanning for the vulnerable fingerprint is cheap and routine. Patching closes the door; log review and credential rotation close out the rest of the response.
Am I affected?
You are affected if your installation matches any of these version ranges:
- adx-mcp-server: <= 1.1.0
Check your installed version against the list above. If you cannot determine the version, treat the system as affected and follow the upgrade path below.
Open adx-mcp-server's About dialog or run the vendor-documented version-check command. Compare the result against the affected ranges in the advisory.
How to fix CVE-2026-33980
- Read the vendor advisory in full: https://github.com/pab1it0/adx-mcp-server/security/advisories/GHSA-vphc-468g-8rfp
- Upgrade adx-mcp-server to the patched build listed in the vendor advisory.
- Back up the configuration (and database, where applicable) before upgrading.
- Rotate any credentials, API keys, or session tokens that the vulnerable service touched. An unauthenticated RCE-class flaw means anything the process could see should be treated as exposed.
- Apply the patch in a maintenance window. For HA pairs, upgrade the standby node first, fail over, then upgrade the former primary.
- Restart the affected service so the patched binary loads, then verify the new version (see verification section).
<!-- enrich-agent-8 -->
Apply the Microsoft security update for adx-mcp-server
Vendor advisory: https://github.com/pab1it0/adx-mcp-server/security/advisories/GHSA-vphc-468g-8rfp
# Vendor advisory: https://github.com/pab1it0/adx-mcp-server/security/advisories/GHSA-vphc-468g-8rfp
# Confirm the patch is missing on this host.
Get-Hotfix -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Sort-Object InstalledOn -Descending |
Select-Object -First 10
# Install the latest cumulative + security rollup that ships the fix for adx-mcp-server.
Install-Module PSWindowsUpdate -Force -SkipPublisherCheck
Import-Module PSWindowsUpdate
Get-WindowsUpdate -AcceptAll -Install -AutoReboot
# After reboot, verify the patched build is in place (<patched-version>).
Get-ComputerInfo -Property WindowsVersion, OsBuildNumber, OsHardwareAbstractionLayer
# Inventory missing patches across many Windows hosts via Ansible (winrm).
ansible windows -m win_updates -a "category_names=SecurityUpdates state=installed"
Verify the fix landed
# Vendor advisory: https://github.com/pab1it0/adx-mcp-server/security/advisories/GHSA-vphc-468g-8rfp
# 1. Confirm the running version matches the fixed-in version listed above.
# 2. Re-scan with your vulnerability scanner (Nessus, Qualys, Tenable, OpenVAS).
# The scanner should no longer flag this CVE on the patched target.
# 3. Inspect recent service / kernel logs for crash-loops or rollback events.
journalctl -u <service> --since "10 minutes ago"
dmesg --since "10 minutes ago"
<!-- enrich-agent-8 -->
If you cannot patch immediately
No official workaround exists beyond restricting network exposure to the affected component. Apply the vendor patch as the primary remediation.
How to verify the fix worked
- After applying the patch, verify the running version in the product's admin UI or via the vendor-documented CLI command.
- Confirm the patched build matches the version listed in the vendor advisory.
- Run an authenticated vulnerability scan with a current signature set and confirm the scanner no longer flags CVE-2026-33980.
- Review logs for the entire pre-patch window for indicators of compromise listed in the vendor or CISA advisory.
- Confirm any network-layer mitigations that were applied as a stopgap have been reverted (or left in place intentionally) once the patch is verified.
If your installation was internet-reachable during the disclosure window, treat log review as part of the remediation rather than an optional follow-up. Look for unexpected administrator accounts in adx-mcp-server, scheduled tasks or cron jobs you did not create, new files in web-accessible directories, and outbound connections to addresses not in your baseline. Suspicious requests to the vulnerable endpoint immediately followed by successful 200-class responses with unusually large bodies are a strong indicator of exploitation.
Frequently asked questions
Is CVE-2026-33980 being exploited in the wild?
Public exploitation has not been confirmed by CISA at the time of writing. Treat the patch as time-sensitive anyway; reports often lag actual abuse.
Will a WAF or IDS rule fully mitigate CVE-2026-33980?
No. Network-layer filters can reduce noise and slow opportunistic scanners, but they will not stop a determined attacker. The vendor patch is the only durable fix.
Do I need to assume compromise if my adx-mcp-server was internet-facing and unpatched?
For an unauthenticated RCE-class flaw exposed to the public internet during the known exploitation window, yes. Review logs, rotate credentials the process could access, and look for unexpected accounts, scheduled tasks, or outbound connections.
References
- Official vendor advisory: https://github.com/pab1it0/adx-mcp-server/security/advisories/GHSA-vphc-468g-8rfp
- NVD entry: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33980
- CISA KEV catalog: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
- Additional vendor or research reference: https://github.com/pab1it0/adx-mcp-server/commit/0abe0ee55279e111281076393e5e966335fffd30
*This guide was assembled from the official vendor advisory, the NVD record, and the CISA KEV catalog entry on 2026-05-25. Always confirm against the vendor advisory before applying changes in production.*