How to Fix CVE-2026-35368: CWE-426: Untrusted Search Path in coreutils
By Sai Kiran Pandrala
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Last verified: 2026-05-25
CVE-2026-35368 is a cwe-426: untrusted search path in Uutils coreutils. Fix it by upgrading to the patched build from the vendor advisory.
| Severity | CVSS 7.2 - High |
|---|---|
| Actively exploited? | Not currently in the CISA KEV catalog |
| Affected | See vendor advisory for affected versions |
| Fixed in | See vendor advisory |
| Type (CWE) | CWE-426: CWE-426: Untrusted Search Path |
What is CVE-2026-35368?
CVE-2026-35368 is a cwe-426: untrusted search path flaw in Uutils coreutils. It carries a CVSS base score of 7.2 (high). It is not currently listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
From the source record: A vulnerability exists in the chroot utility of uutils coreutils when using the --userspec option. The utility resolves the user specification via getpwnam() after entering the chroot but before dropping root privileges. On glibc-based systems, this can trigger the Name Service Switch (NSS) to load shared libraries (e.g., libnss_*.so.2) from the new root directory. If the NEWROOT is writable by an attacker, they can inject a malicious NSS module to execute arbitrary code as root, facilitating a full container escape or privilege escalation.
Why it matters in practice: The blast radius depends on how the affected service is exposed. An internet-facing instance with no compensating controls is the highest-risk configuration.
Am I affected?
You are affected if your installation of coreutils matches a version listed in the Affected row above.
Check the running version against the Affected row above using the product's admin console or --version flag.
How to fix CVE-2026-35368
Apply the vendor patch. Target the build named in the Fixed in row above (See vendor advisory). The runnable command set below covers the most common deployment patterns for coreutils.
Generic upgrade pattern
If the affected product is a Linux package, upgrade via the system package manager:
# Debian / Ubuntu
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get upgrade -y
# RHEL / Rocky / Alma
sudo dnf upgrade --security -y
If it ships as a Windows installer, download the patched build from the vendor advisory and:
# Vendor advisory: https://github.com/uutils/coreutils/issues/10327
Start-Process msiexec.exe -ArgumentList '/i <patched-installer>.msi /qn /norestart' -Wait
Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\* | \
Where-Object DisplayName -match '<product-name>' | Select-Object DisplayName, DisplayVersion
After applying the patch
- Restart the service or device so the patched binary loads.
- Confirm the running version matches the Fixed in row using the verification command below.
- Rotate credentials and API keys that the affected service could access if the asset was exposed during the disclosure window.
If you can't patch immediately
Until the patch lands, narrow the attack surface with these runnable controls.
Restrict network exposure
Block public access to the affected service at the perimeter. Allow only trusted source IPs.
# Linux iptables: only allow trusted admin subnet
sudo iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -s 10.10.10.0/24 -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -j DROP
sudo iptables-save | sudo tee /etc/iptables/rules.v4
# Windows firewall: only allow trusted admin subnet on management port
New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName "Restrict-Mgmt-Allow" -Direction Inbound -Action Allow `
-RemoteAddress 10.10.10.0/24 -Protocol TCP -LocalPort 443
New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName "Restrict-Mgmt-Deny" -Direction Inbound -Action Block `
-Protocol TCP -LocalPort 443
Mitigations are temporary. Apply the vendor patch as soon as a maintenance window opens.
How to verify the fix worked
Confirm the patched build is the one actually running.
Check the running version against the Affected row above using the product's admin console or --version flag.
Expected: a version at or above the patched build named in the vendor advisory.
Also worth doing: pull recent log windows for indicators of compromise listed in the vendor advisory, and re-run an authenticated vulnerability scan with up-to-date signatures.
Frequently asked questions
Is CVE-2026-35368 being exploited in the wild?
As of 2026-05-25, CVE-2026-35368 is not listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Watch the catalog and patch on a normal cadence; KEV status can change as exploitation evidence emerges.
What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-35368?
The CVSS base score is 7.2 (High).
What version fixes this?
The vendor advisory names the patched build. See the References section.
Will a WAF or IDS rule alone close this?
No. Network filters cut down opportunistic scans but they do not remove the flaw. The vendor patch is the only durable fix.
References
- Official vendor advisory: https://github.com/uutils/coreutils/issues/10327
- NVD entry: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35368
- CISA KEV catalog: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
*Assembled from the official vendor advisory, the NVD record, and the CISA KEV listing on 2026-05-25. Always confirm against the vendor advisory before applying changes in production.*