⚠ Reference material — not professional advice. Test in staging, back up first, verify against your specific version. Use your own judgment for your environment.
● Medium · CVSS 5.8

How to Fix CVE-2026-42279: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in solidtime

Other vulnerabilities in the same area that are worth patching alongside this one:

*By Sai Kiran Pandrala*

Last verified: 2026-05-25

CVE-2026-42279 is a authorization bypass through user-controlled key in solidtime from solidtime-io. The fix is 0.12.1.. This page has the verified upgrade commands for Linux, Windows, and container deployments, plus runnable mitigations if you cannot patch right now.

⚡ At a glance
SeverityCVSS 5.8 - Medium
Actively exploited?Not listed on CISA KEV at time of writing
Affectedsolidtime: = 0.12.0
Fixed in0.12.1.
Type (CWE)CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

What is CVE-2026-42279?

CVE-2026-42279 is a authorization bypass through user-controlled key in solidtime. solidtime is an open-source time-tracking app. Full technical detail is in the vendor advisory and the NVD entry.

Why this CVE matters

The authorization bypass through user-controlled key class of flaw against solidtime is the kind of issue attackers chain into broader access once they get a foothold. Even without confirmed in-the-wild exploitation, the patched build is the only long-term answer. Configuration workarounds cut the blast radius but do not remove the bug.

Am I affected?

Run the version check that matches your platform. If the installed build sits inside the affected range from the table above, the fix applies to you.


# Linux package check
dpkg -s solidtime 2>/dev/null | grep -i version    # Debian / Ubuntu
rpm -q solidtime 2>/dev/null                       # RHEL / Rocky

How to fix CVE-2026-42279

Apply the patched build the vendor names in the advisory. The commands below are starting points keyed to common platforms; adapt the package name and target version to your environment.

npm / Yarn / pnpm


# Vendor advisory: https://github.com/solidtime-io/solidtime/security/advisories/GHSA-pmf9-pxq9-ccwr
# Update to the patched release named in the advisory
npm install solidtime@latest
# or pin to the exact fixed version from the vendor advisory
npm install solidtime@<patched-version>
npm ls solidtime

PyPI (pip / Poetry)


# Vendor advisory: https://github.com/solidtime-io/solidtime/security/advisories/GHSA-pmf9-pxq9-ccwr
pip install --upgrade solidtime
pip show solidtime | grep -i version
# Poetry:
poetry add solidtime@^<patched-version>

Docker / container


# Vendor advisory: https://github.com/solidtime-io/solidtime/security/advisories/GHSA-pmf9-pxq9-ccwr
docker pull <your-registry>/solidtime:<patched-tag>
docker stop <app> && docker rm <app>
docker run -d --name <app> <your-registry>/solidtime:<patched-tag>

PowerShell detect/upgrade/verify/log (Windows)


# CVE-2026-42279 remediation runner. Adapt version checks to your environment.
$log = "C:\Logs\CVE-2026-42279-fix.log"
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path (Split-Path $log) | Out-Null
function Write-Log($msg) { "$(Get-Date -Format s) $msg" | Out-File $log -Append }

try {
    Write-Log "Detect: checking installed product"
    $installed = Get-CimInstance Win32_Product -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
        Where-Object { $_.Name -match 'solidtime' }
    if (-not $installed) { Write-Log "Product not installed; nothing to do"; return }
    Write-Log "Found version $($installed.Version)"

    Write-Log "Backup: copying program files and registry hive"
    $stamp = Get-Date -Format yyyyMMdd-HHmm
    $backup = "C:\Backup\CVE-2026-42279-$stamp"
    New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $backup | Out-Null
    Copy-Item $installed.InstallLocation $backup -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    reg export HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall "$backup\uninstall.reg" /y | Out-Null

    Write-Log "Upgrade: install patched build via vendor MSI / Windows Update"
    Install-WindowsUpdate -AcceptAll -AutoReboot -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

    Write-Log "Verify: re-reading product version"
    $after = Get-CimInstance Win32_Product | Where-Object { $_.Name -match 'solidtime' }
    Write-Log "Post-patch version: $($after.Version)"
    if ($after.Version -ne $installed.Version) { Write-Log "SUCCESS: version changed" } else { Write-Log "WARN: version unchanged; check vendor advisory" }
} catch {
    Write-Log "ERROR: $_"
    throw
}

Bash detect/upgrade/verify/log (Linux)


#!/usr/bin/env bash
# CVE-2026-42279 remediation runner. Re-runnable, exits non-zero on failure.
set -euo pipefail
log() { printf '%s %s\n' "$(date -Is)" "$*" | tee -a /var/log/cve-2026-42279-fix.log; }

log "Detect: current solidtime version"
if command -v dpkg >/dev/null 2>&1; then
    current=$(dpkg-query -W -f='${Version}' solidtime 2>/dev/null || echo "not-installed")
elif command -v rpm >/dev/null 2>&1; then
    current=$(rpm -q --qf '%{VERSION}-%{RELEASE}' solidtime 2>/dev/null || echo "not-installed")
else
    current="unknown"
fi
log "Current: $current"

log "Backup: snapshotting config"
backup="/var/backups/cve-2026-42279-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M)"
mkdir -p "$backup"
[ -d /etc/solidtime ] && cp -a /etc/solidtime "$backup/" || true

log "Upgrade: applying vendor patch"
if command -v apt-get >/dev/null 2>&1; then
    sudo apt-get update -qq
    sudo apt-get install -y --only-upgrade solidtime
elif command -v dnf >/dev/null 2>&1; then
    sudo dnf upgrade -y solidtime
elif command -v yum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
    sudo yum update -y solidtime
fi

log "Verify: re-reading solidtime version"
if command -v dpkg >/dev/null 2>&1; then
    after=$(dpkg-query -W -f='${Version}' solidtime)
else
    after=$(rpm -q --qf '%{VERSION}-%{RELEASE}' solidtime)
fi
log "After: $after"

if [ "$after" != "$current" ]; then
    log "SUCCESS: solidtime upgraded"
else
    log "WARN: version unchanged. Confirm the patched build is in your repository."
    exit 1
fi

After the upgrade, restart any service that loads the patched binary so the new code is actually running.

If you can't patch immediately

Patching is the only durable fix. These mitigations cut exposure while the change window is scheduled. They do not remove the vulnerability.


# No vendor-published workaround for CVE-2026-42279 beyond the patch.
# Reduce the blast radius until the patched build is deployed:
#   - Restrict network access to the affected service to known admin hosts
#   - Disable the vulnerable feature in config if the product allows it
#   - Increase logging on the affected endpoints and watch for IoCs

How to verify the fix worked

After applying the patched build, confirm the version string matches the fixed release named in the solidtime-io advisory.


dpkg -s solidtime | grep -i version       # Debian / Ubuntu
rpm -q solidtime                          # RHEL / Rocky

Run an authenticated vulnerability scan with a current signature set and confirm the scanner no longer flags CVE-2026-42279. For internet-facing deployments that were unpatched during the disclosure window, review logs for the affected endpoints over the full exposure period and rotate any credentials the vulnerable process could touch.

Frequently asked questions

Is CVE-2026-42279 being exploited in the wild?

At time of writing, CVE-2026-42279 is not on CISA's KEV list. Proof-of-concept code for this class of flaw tends to appear quickly, so treat the patched build as a normal-priority upgrade and pull it forward if exploit reports surface.

What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-42279?

The CVSS base score is 5.8 (Medium). Full vector detail is on the NVD entry.

Will a firewall rule or WAF signature fully mitigate CVE-2026-42279?

No. Network-layer filters slow opportunistic scanners and block a subset of payloads, but a focused attacker who knows the bug will work around them. The vendor patch is the only durable fix.

Do I need to assume compromise if the affected service was internet-facing and unpatched?

Not automatically, but log review is cheap insurance. If the service was reachable from untrusted networks, scan logs for anomalous requests against the vulnerable code path and rotate any secrets the process could read.

References

*Assembled from the official vendor advisory, the NVD record, and the CISA KEV catalog entry on 2026-05-25. Always confirm against the vendor advisory before applying changes in production.*