How to Fix CVE-2026-7466: CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection') in AgentFlow
By Sai Kiran Pandrala
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Last verified: 2026-05-25
CVE-2026-7466 is a cwe-94: improper control of generation of code ('code injection') in berabuddies AgentFlow. Fix it by upgrading to the patched build from the vendor advisory.
| Severity | CVSS 7.7 - High |
|---|---|
| Actively exploited? | Not currently in the CISA KEV catalog |
| Affected | AgentFlow 0 up to (excluding) 1667fa3 |
| Fixed in | See vendor advisory |
| Type (CWE) | CWE-94: CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection') |
What is CVE-2026-7466?
CVE-2026-7466 is a cwe-94: improper control of generation of code ('code injection') flaw in berabuddies AgentFlow. It carries a CVSS base score of 7.7 (high). It is not currently listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
From the source record: AgentFlow contains an arbitrary code execution vulnerability that allows attackers to execute local Python pipeline files by supplying a user-controlled pipeline_path parameter to the POST /api/runs and POST /api/runs/validate endpoints. Attackers can induce requests to the local AgentFlow API to load and execute existing Python pipeline files on disk, resulting in code execution in the context of the user running AgentFlow.
Why it matters in practice: The blast radius depends on how the affected service is exposed. An internet-facing instance with no compensating controls is the highest-risk configuration.
Am I affected?
You are affected if your installation of AgentFlow matches a version listed in the Affected row above.
Check the running version against the Affected row above using the product's admin console or --version flag.
How to fix CVE-2026-7466
Apply the vendor patch. Target the build named in the Fixed in row above (See vendor advisory). The runnable command set below covers the most common deployment patterns for AgentFlow.
Generic upgrade pattern
If the affected product is a Linux package, upgrade via the system package manager:
# Debian / Ubuntu
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get upgrade -y
# RHEL / Rocky / Alma
sudo dnf upgrade --security -y
If it ships as a Windows installer, download the patched build from the vendor advisory and:
# Vendor advisory: https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/agentflow-arbitrary-python-pipeline-execution-via-pipeline-path
Start-Process msiexec.exe -ArgumentList '/i <patched-installer>.msi /qn /norestart' -Wait
Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\* | \
Where-Object DisplayName -match '<product-name>' | Select-Object DisplayName, DisplayVersion
After applying the patch
- Restart the service or device so the patched binary loads.
- Confirm the running version matches the Fixed in row using the verification command below.
- Rotate credentials and API keys that the affected service could access if the asset was exposed during the disclosure window.
If you can't patch immediately
Until the patch lands, narrow the attack surface with these runnable controls.
Restrict network exposure
Block public access to the affected service at the perimeter. Allow only trusted source IPs.
# Linux iptables: only allow trusted admin subnet
sudo iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -s 10.10.10.0/24 -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -j DROP
sudo iptables-save | sudo tee /etc/iptables/rules.v4
# Windows firewall: only allow trusted admin subnet on management port
New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName "Restrict-Mgmt-Allow" -Direction Inbound -Action Allow `
-RemoteAddress 10.10.10.0/24 -Protocol TCP -LocalPort 443
New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName "Restrict-Mgmt-Deny" -Direction Inbound -Action Block `
-Protocol TCP -LocalPort 443
Mitigations are temporary. Apply the vendor patch as soon as a maintenance window opens.
How to verify the fix worked
Confirm the patched build is the one actually running.
Check the running version against the Affected row above using the product's admin console or --version flag.
Expected: a version at or above the patched build named in the vendor advisory.
Also worth doing: pull recent log windows for indicators of compromise listed in the vendor advisory, and re-run an authenticated vulnerability scan with up-to-date signatures.
Frequently asked questions
Is CVE-2026-7466 being exploited in the wild?
As of 2026-05-25, CVE-2026-7466 is not listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Watch the catalog and patch on a normal cadence; KEV status can change as exploitation evidence emerges.
What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-7466?
The CVSS base score is 7.7 (High).
What version fixes this?
The vendor advisory names the patched build. See the References section.
Will a WAF or IDS rule alone close this?
No. Network filters cut down opportunistic scans but they do not remove the flaw. The vendor patch is the only durable fix.
References
- Official vendor advisory: https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/agentflow-arbitrary-python-pipeline-execution-via-pipeline-path
- NVD entry: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-7466
- CISA KEV catalog: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
- Additional reference: https://github.com/berabuddies/agentflow/pull/18
- Additional reference: https://github.com/berabuddies/agentflow/pull/18/changes/7e61b6ce846b3d700456e4874394dc868905a9f2
*Assembled from the official vendor advisory, the NVD record, and the CISA KEV listing on 2026-05-25. Always confirm against the vendor advisory before applying changes in production.*