What version of Apache OFBiz fixes CVE-2026-45434?

Apache OFBiz 24.09.06 fixes CVE-2026-45434. Every release before 24.09.06 is affected. Download the patched release from ofbiz.apache.org, redeploy, and restart the OFBiz service.

Is CVE-2026-45434 being actively exploited?

As of the advisory, the CISA ADP SSVC record sets Exploitation to none, so there is no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation and the CVE is not on the CISA KEV catalog. The CISA Automatable flag is yes and Technical Impact is total, so opportunistic scanning is likely once a public exploit appears. Patch on a critical-severity schedule.

Can a WAF block CVE-2026-45434 without upgrading OFBiz?

A WAF in front of the OFBiz password-change endpoint can slow opportunistic probes but cannot reliably fix the logic flaw. Because the bug is unauthenticated (PR:N) and needs no user interaction (UI:N), the only durable fix is upgrading to Apache OFBiz 24.09.06.

● Critical · CVSS 9.8

CVE-2026-45434: Fixing the Apache OFBiz Password-Change Bypass Before It Becomes Remote Code Execution

By the Sai Kiran Pandrala · Reviewed and edited by Sai Kiran Pandrala, Editor

⚡ At a glance

Severity	Critical — CVSS 3.1 base 9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H), Apache rates it "important"
Actively exploited?	No confirmed exploitation (CISA SSVC Exploitation: none); not on CISA KEV
Affected	Apache OFBiz, all releases before 24.09.06
Fixed in	Apache OFBiz 24.09.06
Type (CWE)	CWE-287: Improper Authentication (password-change logic flaw → RCE)
Reported by	Mike Cole; advisory published 2026-05-19

Exploitation status

As of the 20 May 2026 CISA ADP vulnrichment timestamp, nobody has reported CVE-2026-45434 being used in the wild. The SSVC record sets Exploitation: none, and the CVE is absent from the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Do not file that under "safe", though: the very same record flags Automatable: yes and Technical Impact: total. An unauthenticated bug that scripts cleanly and gives full control is the profile that goes from quiet to mass-scanned the week a proof of concept drops.

The two primary sources are the Apache mailing-list advisory and the oss-security post dated 19 May 2026. Neither references a Metasploit module or a published exploit script at the time of writing. That gap is your head start, not your reprieve. Getting from a password-change request to code execution on a Java ERP server is the kind of chain researchers tend to rebuild quickly once the disclosure is public.

What is CVE-2026-45434?

CVE-2026-45434 is an improper-authentication flaw (CWE-287) in the password-change logic of Apache OFBiz, the open-source Java ERP and e-commerce suite. The Apache Software Foundation describes it as a "Password-Change Logic Flaw Leading to Remote Code Execution": a remote, unauthenticated attacker can abuse the flow so that they bypass authentication and ultimately run code on the OFBiz host. Every release before 24.09.06 is affected, and 24.09.06 is the fixed release. CISA's ADP analysis scores it CVSS 3.1 9.8 (vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) and Apache labels it "important".

Two facts make this worse than a plain login bypass. First, OFBiz bundles its own application server and ships with a powerful service/screen engine, so "code execution" here means code on the box, not just data access. Second, the entry point is the password-change handler, a feature that, by design, often sits in front of the authenticated area so users can reset their own credentials. That combination is why a logic slip in that one handler escalates all the way to RCE.

Why this CVE matters

An unauthenticated RCE on an ERP platform is close to the worst case for a business application. OFBiz runs accounting, order management, inventory, CRM, and the storefront for the companies that deploy it, so the OFBiz process usually has database credentials, payment-gateway keys, and customer records within reach. With PR:N and UI:N in the CVSS vector, an attacker needs no account and no victim to click anything; they just need network reach to the OFBiz port (commonly 443/8443 or the 8443 https connector in default installs).

The CISA SSVC flags drive the urgency: Automatable "yes" means the exploitation step can be scripted against many targets at once, and Technical Impact "total" means a successful hit gives full control of the affected component. There is no confirmed exploitation yet, but storefront-facing OFBiz instances are discoverable through their default login screens and service URLs, so a working exploit would find targets quickly. Upgrade to 24.09.06; that is the durable fix.

Am I affected? Confirm your OFBiz version

You are affected if you run any Apache OFBiz build older than 24.09.06. There is no partial mitigation by minor version below that line; the whole pre-24.09.06 range is in scope.

OFBiz is a self-contained Java app, not the Apache HTTP server, so do not check it with httpd -v or a package manager. Find the version one of these ways:

Release notes file in the install: cat /opt/ofbiz/RELEASE-NOTES (or wherever OFBiz is unpacked) shows the release string near the top.
Gradle/version metadata: from the OFBiz home run grep -ri "version" gradle.properties build.gradle 2>/dev/null | grep -i ofbiz, or check the release.properties / framework VERSION file shipped with the distribution.
Running instance: the OFBiz web UI footer and the Webtools "Server Hit Statistics" / about screens print the release; the startup log (runtime/logs/ofbiz.log) records the version banner each time the service boots.

If you cannot pin down an exact build, treat the host as affected and upgrade.

How to fix CVE-2026-45434

Read the vendor advisory in full: https://lists.apache.org/thread/yw4owrzl0yho1yx7oqxvr6xjkmln9tq8
Upgrade Apache OFBiz to the patched build listed in the vendor advisory.
Back up the configuration (and database, where applicable) before upgrading.
Rotate any credentials, API keys, or session tokens that the vulnerable service touched. An unauthenticated RCE-class flaw means anything the process could see should be treated as exposed.
Apply the patch in a maintenance window. For HA pairs, upgrade the standby node first, fail over, then upgrade the former primary.
Restart the affected service so the patched binary loads, then verify the new version (see verification section).

Upgrade OFBiz to 24.09.06

OFBiz is not an OS package. You do not fix it with apt, dnf, or Windows Update; those touch Apache HTTP Server, a different project. You replace the OFBiz distribution itself and rebuild from the patched source or release archive, then restart the bundled application server. The steps below assume a standard install under /opt/ofbiz running as a dedicated ofbiz user.

# CVE-2026-45434 - Apache OFBiz, all versions before 24.09.06. Fixed in 24.09.06.
# Vendor advisory: https://lists.apache.org/thread/yw4owrzl0yho1yx7oqxvr6xjkmln9tq8

# 1. Stop the running instance and back up data + config first.
cd /opt/ofbiz
./gradlew "ofbiz --shutdown"          # graceful stop; or: sudo systemctl stop ofbiz
sudo -u ofbiz cp -a /opt/ofbiz /opt/ofbiz.bak-$(date +%F)   # full snapshot
# Also dump the backing database (PostgreSQL/Derby/etc.) with your usual tool.

# 2. Fetch the 24.09.06 release branch/tag from the OFBiz git repo (no apt/dnf).
sudo -u ofbiz git fetch --tags
sudo -u ofbiz git checkout release24.09        # then pull the 24.09.06 tag
sudo -u ofbiz git pull

# 3. Clean and rebuild against the patched source.
sudo -u ofbiz ./gradlew cleanAll
sudo -u ofbiz ./gradlew loadDefault   # only if you intend to (re)seed; skip on prod with live data
sudo -u ofbiz ./gradlew build

# 4. Restart and tail the boot banner to confirm the release.
sudo -u ofbiz ./gradlew ofbiz &
grep -i "release" /opt/ofbiz/runtime/logs/ofbiz.log | tail -5

If you deploy OFBiz from a pre-built release archive rather than git, download the 24.09.06 archive from ofbiz.apache.org/download.html, verify its PGP signature and SHA-512 against the published values, then unpack it over a clean directory and migrate your framework/security, data, and config in. Do not unzip on top of the old tree.

Verify the fix actually applied

Three independent checks confirm 24.09.06 is live: the boot banner, the running JAR build, and a re-scan. Patching the source but forgetting the rebuild is the most common way the fix silently does not take.

# CVE-2026-45434 post-upgrade verification (Apache OFBiz).

# 1. Boot banner - must show 24.09.06 (not a pre-24.09.06 string).
grep -i "release" /opt/ofbiz/runtime/logs/ofbiz.log | tail -3

# 2. Confirm the rebuilt artifact, not just the source, is on 24.09.06.
cat /opt/ofbiz/VERSION 2>/dev/null || \
  grep -ri "release" /opt/ofbiz/gradle.properties /opt/ofbiz/build.gradle 2>/dev/null | grep -i ofbiz

# 3. Confirm the password-change flow no longer authenticates without valid
#    credentials, then re-scan with Nessus/Qualys/OpenVAS; it must not flag
#    CVE-2026-45434.

# 4. Check the service came back cleanly (no crash-loop on the bundled server).
journalctl -u ofbiz --since "10 minutes ago" 2>/dev/null || tail -50 /opt/ofbiz/runtime/logs/ofbiz.log

If you cannot patch immediately

Restrict access to the affected administrative interface to trusted internal networks. Disable the vulnerable component if the vendor documents that as an interim option. Patch immediately when feasible.

Full fix path

After applying the patch, verify the running version in the product's admin UI or via the vendor-documented CLI command.
Confirm the patched build matches the version listed in the vendor advisory.
Run an authenticated vulnerability scan with a current signature set and confirm the scanner no longer flags CVE-2026-45434.
Review logs for the entire pre-patch window for indicators of compromise listed in the vendor or CISA advisory.
Confirm any network-layer mitigations that were applied as a stopgap have been reverted (or left in place intentionally) once the patch is verified.

If your installation was internet-reachable during the disclosure window, treat log review as part of the remediation rather than an optional follow-up. Look for unexpected administrator accounts in Apache OFBiz, scheduled tasks or cron jobs you did not create, new files in web-accessible directories, and outbound connections to addresses not in your baseline. Suspicious requests to the vulnerable endpoint immediately followed by successful 200-class responses with unusually large bodies are a strong indicator of exploitation.

Frequently asked questions

Is CVE-2026-45434 being exploited in the wild?

Public exploitation has not been confirmed by CISA at the time of writing. Treat the patch as time-sensitive anyway; reports often lag actual abuse.

Will a WAF or IDS rule fully mitigate CVE-2026-45434?

No. Network-layer filters can reduce noise and slow opportunistic scanners, but they will not stop a determined attacker. The vendor patch is the only durable fix.

Do I need to assume compromise if my Apache OFBiz was internet-facing and unpatched?

For an unauthenticated RCE-class flaw exposed to the public internet during the known exploitation window, yes. Review logs, rotate credentials the process could access, and look for unexpected accounts, scheduled tasks, or outbound connections.

Additional nearby issues sensible to fix in the same maintenance window:

References

Official Apache OFBiz advisory (mailing list thread): https://lists.apache.org/thread/yw4owrzl0yho1yx7oqxvr6xjkmln9tq8
oss-security disclosure (19 May 2026): http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/19/29
Apache OFBiz downloads (24.09.06 release archive + signatures): https://ofbiz.apache.org/download.html

This guide was written from the Apache OFBiz CNA record (published 2026-05-19), the CISA ADP vulnrichment data, and the oss-security disclosure. CVSS 9.8 and the SSVC "Exploitation: none" status come from the CISA ADP container; the fixed version 24.09.06 comes from the Apache advisory. Always confirm against the vendor advisory before applying changes in production.

What the CVSS vector tells you about exploitability

The CVSS 3.1 vector for CVE-2026-45434 is AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, base score 9.8. Read left to right, it says an attacker needs only network reach and nothing else to win. Each metric maps to a real precondition:

AV:N (network). The password-change endpoint is reachable over the network. Any OFBiz instance exposed on its HTTPS connector (8443 by default, or 443 behind a reverse proxy) is in range from anywhere it can route to.
AC:L (low complexity). No race window, no specific server state, no fragile timing. The logic flaw triggers reliably on demand.
PR:N (no privileges). The attacker does not need an account. That is the whole point of an authentication-bypass: it works before login.
UI:N (no user interaction). No admin has to click a link or open a file. This is not a phishing chain; it is a direct send-and-own.
C:H / I:H / A:H. Because OFBiz bundles its own service and screen engine, reaching code execution means full read, full write, and the ability to take the application down. The CISA SSVC record agrees: Technical Impact is "total".

The one piece of good news is in the same record: SSVC Exploitation is "none", meaning no in-the-wild abuse has been observed and the CVE is not on the CISA KEV catalog. But Automatable is "yes". A bug that needs no auth, no interaction, and works the first time is exactly the kind that gets sprayed across the internet the moment a proof of concept lands. Treat 9.8/unauthenticated/automatable as "patch this week", not "patch eventually".

What to look for if you were exposed

If your OFBiz was internet-reachable before you upgraded, do a log review rather than assume you were missed. The flaw lives in the password-change flow, so start there. Pull the OFBiz access log (runtime/logs/access.log) and the main log (runtime/logs/ofbiz.log) and look for:

Repeated POSTs to the password-change / changePassword control path from unauthenticated sessions, especially clustered in time or from a single source range.
New administrator or partyId accounts you did not create, or unexpected changes to the UserLogin / security-group tables.
The OFBiz JVM spawning child processes it should never spawn, a shell, a downloader, or a scripting interpreter, which is the signature of the RCE stage.
New or modified files under web-accessible directories, and outbound connections from the OFBiz host to addresses not in your baseline.

Because this is an authentication-bypass leading to code execution, if you find evidence of abuse, treat the host as compromised: rebuild from a known-good image rather than just patching, and rotate every credential the OFBiz process could read (database, payment-gateway, integration API keys).

Ranked mitigations if you cannot upgrade today

The only durable fix is 24.09.06. Until you can schedule the rebuild, these compensating controls reduce exposure, in rough order of effectiveness:

Take the instance off the public internet. If OFBiz does not need to face the world, restrict its HTTPS connector to an internal network or VPN with a firewall rule. AV:N exposure drops sharply the moment the endpoint is not reachable from arbitrary networks.
Block the password-change path at the reverse proxy. If you front OFBiz with nginx, Apache HTTP Server, or a WAF, deny unauthenticated requests to the password-change control. This is a stopgap, not a fix; a logic flaw can have more than one route, so do not treat a proxy rule as remediation.
Tighten monitoring on the endpoint. Alert on any POST to the change-password path from a session that never authenticated, and on any child process spawned by the OFBiz JVM.

None of these close the underlying flaw. They buy time. Put the 24.09.06 rebuild on the next maintenance window and remove the stopgaps once it is verified.